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Purpose: This study aims at examining the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance about manufacturing 
companies listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).  
Research Methodology: The analysis empirically uses dynamic 
panel data from 15 pharmaceutical and chemical companies enlisted 
in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). The study period was 2011-2020. 
The study used panel data regression analysis. 
Results: The study confirms that sampled companies' financial 
performance represented by ROA and ROE is significantly 
influenced by institutional ownership, ownership concentration, and 
foreign ownership whereas, negatively influenced by managerial 
ownership and insider ownership. The study didn't find any 
noteworthy association between block holders' ownership with 
firms' performance.  
Contribution: This study keeps a significant role in understanding 
the ownership structures’ influence on firms’ performance. More 
specifically the policymakers may consider the study for 
implementing the relevant issues.  
Limitations: The study's results were restricted to 15 Bangladeshi 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies enlisted in DSE and could 
not be applied to other companies doing business in Bangladesh. 
Keywords: Firm Performance, Managerial Ownership, Ownership 
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1. Introduction 
The ownership concentration and organization on market efficiency is significant aspect to consider 
when deciding on the best-governing structure for a particular company. Corporate ownership is broadly 
spread, and ownership and management are narrowly segregated, according to the majority of research 
on corporate governance principles of modern businesses. However, research reveals that several 
nations, especially those outside the Anglo-Saxon world, have a high concentration of ownership 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance finds ownership arrangement and company 
efficiency to be essential structural concerns. Historically, centralized control has been seen as better 
surveillance and development benefits (Leech and Leahy, 1991). However, at the disadvantage of 
financial institutions, the controlling owners can still make a private profit (Maher and Andersson, 
1999). What matters fundamentally for businesses, policymakers, as well as analysts, are when and how 
ownership structure impacts firm performance. Most research into the ownership structure and 
corporate performance have shown better return rates for concentrated companies. Owing to the 
assumption that its overall influence relies on the relative severity of rewards and reinforcing impacts, 
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different management restrictions have long been problematic, but foreign ownership and institutional 
ownership have attracted less scrutiny. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), while adapting them to causal owning 
variables and other variables, noted a little relationship between the concentration of ownership and 
efficiency of big US companies. Since the ownership-performance relationship is controversial in 
principle, scientific experiments are becoming increasingly important in deciding which of the 
scientifically testable hypotheses is the most likely. The conclusions come from a 2001 study performed 
between 1998 and 2000 of 202 medium and large enterprises. This study calculated the ownership 
composition by the number of securities held by each investor type and projected efficiency by income 
per employee. The hypothesis that centralized external ownership enhances performance was tested 
with regression analysis. The results revealed a significant influence on efficiency.  Normally, 
Ukrainian external owners had no significant impact on results. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, (2006) tried 
to ascertain if the idea that changes in the observed corporate ownership structure contribute to systemic 
adjustments for business results is substantially endorsed. 
 
Morck et al. (1988) investigated whether in 1980, for 456 fortune 500 companies, the non-linear 
connection exists between managing ownership and firm performance.  What fundamentally matters 
for corporations, politicians, and analysts are when and how the ownership structure impacts company 
performance. Berle and Means (1932) provided the basic insight into the problems, stating that the 
division of ownership and regulation in modern firms inevitably decreases management incentives to 
optimize organizational productivity (Hu and Izumida, 2008). In addition, institutional investors would 
only invest in companies with projected future success if they were searching for lucrative prospects 
for investment. Global investors make it possible for businesses to have access to superior 
technological, management, and financial capital. There are, however, two reasons why foreign 
investment adversely affects firm efficiency. According to Thomsen, a firm might have a detrimental 
effect if major shareholders, on the other hand, use their control rights to personal advantage. The idea 
of the influence of ownership arrangements on business value started to advance in financial science 
after Jensen and Meckling (1976), both empirically and scientifically. The present study is designed to 
investigate the ownership structure of manufacturing companies in Bangladesh and explore its influence 
on firms’ financial performance. The study chose 15 pharmaceutical and chemical companies enlisted 
in DSE, as a sample size considering the study period 2011-2020. The study basically finds out the 
effect of firms’ specific ownership characteristics along with control variables on financial 
performance.  
 
2. Literature review 
Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
The concentration of ownership is regarded as the degree in which its main shareholders own the stock 
of a corporation (Sanda et al., 2005). Tested research in developing countries confirms that 
concentration seems to be linked to strong performance (Wang and Oliver, 2009; Siala et al., 2009). 
Dakhlallh et al (2019) conducted a study on 180 firms enlisted on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
during the period 2009-2017. The study explored the significant influence of ownership concentration 
on firms’ performance. An analysis of 175 Greek companies shows a hypothesis of the effect of the 
structure of ownership of the company's performance by Greek economists Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 
(2007). Empirical evidence suggests that increasing profitability is enhanced with more stakeholders. 
In these developing countries, they have also seen a decrease in firm productivity. On the other hand, 
several research studies also found a negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance (Roszaini and Mohammad, 2006; Hu et al., 2010; Millet-Reyes and Zhao, 2010). Farooque 
et al (2019) conducted a study on 452 companies enlisted in the Thai Stock Exchange Ltd. over the 
period 2000-2016. Using GMM approach the study found no significant influence of ownership 
concentration on market-based firm performance. Arosa et al. (2010) report that there has been no 
connection between the concentration of ownership of SMEs in Spain and their performance. 
Inadequate evidence was concentrated on the allegations of expropriation and control of the particular 
firms. The findings are unrelated- listed firms according to Miguel et al (2004). It does not affect the 
level of ownership concentration, just as it does not affect behavior. This research gap inspired us to 
explore the true relationship between these two variables.  
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H1 = There is a statistically significant influence of ownership concentration on firm performance.  
 
Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance 
The percentage of management and executive positions occupied by their board members is used to 
determine managerial ownership (Wahla et al., 2012; Liang et al., 2011). Managerial ownership, 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), will help in the resolution of agency conflicts because 
managers are motivated to maximize productivity to produce better performance, resulting in higher 
incentives for owners. As a result, the relation between managerial ownership and corporate 
performance remains unclear. Kao et al (2019) investigated the influence of managerial ownership on 
the financial performance of Taiwanese listed firms during the period 1997-2015. Using 2SLS 
regression model the study found a significant positive influence of managerial ownership on firms’ 
financial performance. Similar research findings were discovered by other researchers like, Leung and 
Horwitz, (2010); Farooque et al (2019); Alabdullah (2018). Other scholars including Irina and 
Nadezhda (2009). Juras and Hinson (2008) have denied their ties in developed countries. 
Similar findings were found in Mandaci and Gumus (2010), Liang et al. (2011), Tsegba and EziHerbert 
(2011), and Wahla et al (2012). In other developing worlds, Ehikioya (2009), Chung et al. (2008), Sing 
and Sirmans (2008), and Hasnah, similar results were found. On the other hand, in either developing or 
developed countries two variables have not been related (Siala, 2009; Nuryanah and Islam, 2011; Mohd, 
2011; NazliAnum, 2010). (Mandaci and Gumus, 2010; Tsegba and EziHerbert, 2011) found similar 
results in developing countries. Ehikioya (2009), Chung et al. (2008), Sing and Sirmans (2008), and 
Hasnah (2009) found similar results in other developing countries. Others, on the other hand, discovered 
no connection between two variables in developing or developed countries (Siala, 2009; Nuryanah and 
Islam, 2011; Juras and Hinson, 2008; Mohd, 2011; Nazli Anum, 2010). Other researchers found no 
correlation in developing or developed countries between two variables (Siala, 2009; Nuryanah and 
Islam, 2011; Juras and Hinson, 2008; Mohd, 2011; Nazli Anum, 2010). 
H2 = There is a statistically significant influence of managerial ownership on firm performance.  
 
Institutional ownership and Firm Performance 
Institutional investors are commonly considered to be essential for good corporate governance since 
they have both the capacity and motivation to keep a close eye on management (Ping and Wing, 2011; 
Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007). Dakhlallh et al (2019) performed research on 180 companies listed on 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 2009-2017 in which the researchers claimed that 
institutional ownership has a significant noteworthy impact on firms’ financial performance. Similar 
research results were produced by Kao et al (2019); Amin and Hamadan (2018). According to these 
authors, institutional investors may hold management accountable because the free-rider issue may be 
reduced.  
They are also powerful because they can bear the expense of successful oversight and be involved in 
board decision-making, leading to better firm performance (Rose, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The study of Millar and Duggal (1999) claims, however, are at odds with both institutional investors' 
ability to track and improve the firm's ability to succeed. Gorton and Kahl (1999) likewise argue that, 
because of their agency conflict, institutional investors may be unimportant for the firm's performance. 
Several studies have examined the institutional property, but the findings remain unclear. As a result, 
they demonstrated that in developing countries (e.g. Mizuno, 2010, etc.) there are no connections 
between institutional ownership and firm performance (Mishra and Kapil, 2017; Chung et al., 2008; 
Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007; Mollah and Talukdar, 2007). 
H3 = There is a statistically significant influence of institutional ownership on firm performance.  
 
Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance 
Kao et al (2019) investigated the influence of managerial ownership on the financial performance of 
Taiwanese listed firms during the period 1997-2015. Using 2SLS regression model the study found a 
significant positive influence of foreign ownership on firms’ financial performance. Similar research 
findings were discovered by Detthamrong (2017); Saleh et al (2017); Al-Matar et al (2017). Chari et al. 
(2012), Al-Manaseer et al. (2012), and Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) shall decide the percentage of 
foreign equity proposed by international investment. Literature on the relationship between foreign 
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ownership and firm performance is still ongoing. Many studies have investigated this relationship. In 
the developing world, scientists like (Ghahroudi, 2011; Chari et al. 2012) discover important links. In 
all developing countries, NazliAnum (2010), AL Manaseer et al. (2012), Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) 
have come to the same conclusion.  
On the other hand, Amin and Hamdan (2018) have been looking into the relationship between Saudi 
companies' ownership structures and firm performance. In 2013 and 2014 there were no correlations 
between the return on assets of the Saudi companies and the total business performance. As a result, 
they concluded that foreign investment had a negative impact on the performance of their company. 
Shan and Mclver (2011) who researched relationships between international and regional firms in 
developed countries but concluded there was no link in developing countries, reported Millet-Reyes 
and Zhao (2010) while Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) and Tsegba (2011) found a relationship in developing 
countries. 
H4 = There is a statistically significant influence of foreign ownership on firm performance.  
 
Block holders Ownership and Firm Performance 
Several studies examined the effect on firm efficiency of block ownership, and much of the study has 
shown mixed results. A stronger relationship was found between blockholder relationship and firms’ 
financial performance claimed by Ullah, Ali, and Mehmood (2017); Dakhlallh et al (2019). They found 
that the biggest shareholder has a strong connection to the success of the firm. Increased profitability in 
the enterprise needs less distributed ownership according to Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007). It also 
demonstrates that the expected issue of the agency would benefit big non-management block holders 
by reducing value. Moreover, block holders could harm the results of a company because of their high-
risk exposure (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). According to Hollandts and Guedri (2008), the effect of 
employee ownership on business performance from 2000 to 2005 had a negative effect on firm 
performance (a shared shareholder holding 5 percent or more of the company stocks). The impact of 
employee ownership was found to be negative. In the meantime, Hoang, Nguyen, and Hu (2017) agree 
that ownership of blocks has no major impact on the company's performance.  There is no meaningful 
relationship between the firm's valuation and the shares owned by block holders in terms of Loderer 
and Martin (1997), Mehran (1995), McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
H5 = There is a statistically significant influence of blockholder ownership on firm performance.  
 
Insider Ownership and Firm Performance 
Im and Chung (2017) conducted a study on USA-based restaurant firms in where the researchers found 
that insider ownership has a significant influence on firms’ financial performance. Similar research 
findings are explored by Marimuthu (2017) conducted research on 282 non-financial listed companies.  
Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) looked into the effects of insider ownership on firm performance. 
Data from 648 German companies from 2003 to 1998 showed that the company's performance was 
simple and significantly linked to stock price quality. Morck et al. (1988), and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) all found that insider ownership has a positive impact. Compared with other firms, Lauterbach 
and Vaninsky (1999) found that insider ownership makes businesses less competitive than non-owner 
owners. Factors such as insider knowledge and incentives for success are as likely to affect ownership 
according to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). The impact on corporate value, interest alignment, and 
restructuring of insider ownership (La Porta et al. 2000; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001) implies that insider 
ownership and firm performance are not linearly linked. There is a shared desire for lower levels of 
insider access, lower costs for agencies, and better performance. 
H6 = There is a statistically significant influence of insider ownership on firm performance.  
 
3. Research methodology 
This part consists of four sections in where Section 4.1 explains the sample selection and time frame of 
the study; Section 4.2 emphasis on variable definition and measures; Section 4.3 presents the statistical 
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Sample selection and time frame 
At present, there are 31 pharmaceutical and chemical industries enlisted in Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE). The study has excluded 05 companies as they have been formed very recently and 11 companies 
for data unavailability and irrelevancy. Thus the total sample of the study comprises a balanced panel 
of 150 observations for 15 pharmaceutical and chemical companies enlisted in DSE, Bangladesh. Data 
concerned with companies' characteristics (Ownership structure, Firm-level variables) are derived from 
published annual reports of respective companies whereas, macro-economic data are gathered from the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). The study considers data of 2011-2020 years for conducting 




To fulfill the objectives, the study has chosen two main variables i.e. firm performance and ownership 
structure. Two proxy variables were used to measure firms' performance namely, (i) Return on Assets 
(ROA); and (ii) Return on Equity (ROE). Both of these two variables are extensively used by Rostami 
and Kohansal (2016); Al Nimer et al., (2015); Khaled et al., (2020); Pointer and Khoi (2019); Bhabra 
(2007) in their empirical literature. Return on assets (ROA) shows how profitable a company is relative 
to its assets employment (Barry et al., (2011); Hill and Snell (1988). On the other hand, Return on 
Equity reflects an organization's profitability about shareholders' equity (Xu et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
to explore the impact of ownership structure on firms' performance, the study employed ownership 
structure (OS) as the most significant variable. To measure the ownership structure of firms the study 
used Managerial Ownership (MNO), Institutional Ownership (IO), Inside Ownership (InO), Ownership 
Concentration (OC), and Foreign Ownership (FO) as proxy variables.  
 
Firm-level variables 
To inspect the influence of ownership structure on firms' performance, the study employs some firm-
level and industry-level variables including their metaphors and hypothesized signs which are presented 
in Table-1. For conducting the study, firm size (SIZE) measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
is considered as a noteworthy factor that influences the performance of pharmaceutical and chemical 
companies of Bangladesh. Several types of research conducted earlier identified firm size as an effective 
control variable affecting firms' performance (Drakos et al., 2017; Hussain and Hassan, 2019; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Uzun and Webb, 2007; Zribi and Boujelbène, 2011). Another two firm-level 
variables namely, financial leverage (measured by the proportion of total loan to total assets) and 
liquidity (measured by the proportion of liquid reserves to total assets) were also used as control 
variables. Earlier researchers like Arouri et al., (2014), De Jonghe et al., (2015), Laeven and Levine 
(2009), Chalermchatvichien et al., (2014b) found leverage and liquidity as influential factors of firms' 
performance. To find out the response of capital expenditures to the firms' performance the study also 
uses another control variable named capitalization (CAP). 
 
Macroeconomic variables 
By following Chaibi and Ftiti (2015), the study includes one macroeconomic variable namely inflation 
rate (IR) which may affect the endogenous variables. 
 
Summary statistics and correlation analysis 
Table-2 represents the descriptive statistics of main variables, firm-level variables, industry-level 
variables, and macroeconomic variables for the target sample size of the study. In Table 4 the study 
portraits the correlation matrix by employing Pearson's correlation coefficient. The correlation matrix 
disclosed that there exists the highest correlation between ROE and foreign ownership (Pearson’s 




1 Barako and Tower (2007) and Gujarati and Porter (2003) claimed that multicollinearity is a serious problem if 
the correlation coefficient between two independent variables is above 0.80, which is not the case here. 
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 Table 1. Variables’ definition and sources 




    Return on Assets 
 
     
    Return on Equity 
 
Ownership Structure  
    
   Managerial Ownership 
    
 
   Institutional Ownership 
    
 
   Inside Ownership 
    
 
   Ownership Concentration 
   
 
   Foreign Ownership 




























Net profit after tax/ Total assets 
 
 




Shares Held by CEOs, directors, and their Immediate 
Family Members / Number of Total Outstanding Shares  
 
Number of Shares Held by the Institution / Number of 
Total Outstanding Shares 
 
Number of Shares Held by the All Insiders / Number of 
Total Outstanding Shares 
 
Number of Shares Owned by Major shareholders / Number 
of Total Outstanding Shares 
 




























Rostami and Kohansal (2016); Al Nimer (2015); Jewell and Mankin (2011); Hossain and Haque 
(2018); Selling and Stickney (1989); Amran and Ahmad (2013), Butt and Hasan (2009). 
 
Khaled et al., (2020); Pointer and Khoi (2019); Bhabra (2007); Chen et al., (2005), Xu and Wand 
(1999); Xu et al., (2015); Barry et al., (2011); Hill and Snell (1989) 
 
Uddin et al. (2019), Nazir (2015), Bourakba and Zerargui (2015), Shleifer&Vishny (1986), 
Leung and Horwitz’s (2010), Yermack (1996), Jackling&Johl (2009) 
 
Nazir (2015), Uddin et al. (2019), Bourakba and Zerargui (2015), Spring & Rhoades (2017), 
Arora (2012). 
 
Uddin et al. (2019), Bourakba and Zerargui (2015), Muniandy& Hillier, 2015), Switzer & Tang 
(2009), Jackling & Johl (2009), 
 
Nazir (2015), Bourakba and Zerargui (2015), Berle and Means (1932), Claessens, and Djankov 
(1999), Mitton (2002), Becht and Röell (1999) 
 
Vishny (1986), Leung and Horwitz’s (2010), Maury (2006), Bayrakdaroglu (2012), Alabdullah 
et al. (2016), Nguyen (2011), Wiwattanakantang (2001). 
 
Firm Level Variables 
   
   Firm Size 
   
 
   Liquidity 
    












Natural Logarithm of total assets 
 
 
Liquid reserves / total assets 
 













Drakos et al., (2016), Hussain and Hassan (2019), Laeven and Levine (2009), Uzun and Webb 
(2007), Zribi and Boujelbène 2011). 
 
Khaled et al., (2020); Lin et al., (2011); Margaritis and Psillaki (2010); Swandari and Sadikin 
(2016); Moon and Tandon (2007); Abobakr and Elgiziry (2016); Endang (2020) 
 
Arouri et al., (2014), De Jonghe et al., (2012), Laeven and Levine (2009), Chalermchatvichien et 
al. (2014b). 
Industry Level Variables 
  














Abdolmohammadi (2005); Kumar and Shah (2009); Dias (2013); Narayan et al., (2011); 
Willmott (2010); Reinganum (1999); Panagiotidis (2005); Anam et al., (2011); Ray (2012) 
 
Macroeconomic Variables 
   













Chaibi and Ftiti, (2015); Hussain and Hassan (2005); Unite and Sullivan (2003); Coibion et al., 
(2012); Herman (2019); Basse and Reddemann (2011) 
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Empirical model development 
Panel data methodology was used in this study, which entails clustering of observations into time series 
and cross-section units. The panel data analysis provides for greater variation, reduced serial correlation, 
faster adaptation, bigger sample size, inter heterogeneity consideration, greater flexibility in relation to 
time series analysis, and improved efficiency (Din et al., 2017). The following models have been used 
to investigate the influence of ownership structure on company enactment: 
 
ROAit = α0 + β1MNOit + β2IOit + β3InOit +β4OCit + β5FOit +β7SIZEit + β8LIQit + β9LEVit +β10MCit  
                      + β11IFRit + εit ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) 
 
ROEit = α0 + β1MNOit + β2IOit + β3InOit +β4OCit + β5FOit +β7SIZEit + β8LIQit + β9LEVit +β10MCit  
                     + β11IFRit + εit ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2) 
 
In the equations stated above, the ownership variable regressed on firms' performance including the 
effects of control variables. In both equations subscripts i indicates DSE listed pharmaceutical and 
Chemical companies (i=1, 2… 15), and t indicates period (t =2011, 2012… 2020), α and β are the series 
of parameters to be estimated and εit is the error term. In Eq. (1) and (2) Return on Assets (ROA) and 
Return on Equity (ROE) were dependent variables respectively whereas, the ownership structure was 
the independent variable in both of the equations proxied by Managerial Ownership (MNO), 
Institutional Ownership (IO), Inside Ownership (InO), Ownership Concentration (OC) and Foreign 
Ownership (FO). Firm-level control variables were Firm size (SIZE), Liquidity (LIQ), and Leverage 
(LEV) whereas, the industry level control variable includes Market capitalization (MC). The rate of 
inflation (IFR) was the country-level control variable comprised in both models.  
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev 
MNO (%) 48 .04 .71 .43 .14 
IO (%) 48 .03 .55 .18 .11 
InO (%) 48 .04 .46 .16 .09 
OC (%) 48 .02 .61 .21 .14 
FO (%) 48 0 .21 .02 .05 
FS 48 11.5 30.9 20.35 .82 
LIQ 48 .08 .25 .16 .09 
LEV (%) 48 .07 .16 .12 .07 
MC (%) 48 .05 .16 .09 .05 
IFR (%) 48 .054 .059 ..034 2.59 
ROA (%) 48 .02 10.03 3.43 2.24 
ROE (%) 48 .03 6.23 3.19 3.69 
 
Normality Test 
Table 3. Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro- Wilk 
Statistics df Sig. Statistics df Sig. 
MNO 0.197 150 .101* 0.921 150 .206* 
IO 0.278 150 .055* 0.725 150 .329* 
InO 0.368 150 .020* 0.149 150 .219* 
OC 0.201 150 .250* 0.725 150 .364* 
FO 0.165 150 .004 0.823 150 .002 
FS 0.111 150 .200* 0.852 150 .483* 
LIQ 0.068 150 .106* 0.878 150 .399* 
LEV 0.423 150 .120* 0.398 150 .301* 
MC 0.325 150 .213* 0.725 150 .215* 
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IFR 0.423 150 .050* 0.612 150 .124* 
ROA 0.169 150 .004 0.825 150 .202 
ROE 0163 150 .102* 0.325 150 .216* 
 
 
Note: *. This is a lower bound of the true significance.  
a. Lilliefors Significance correction.  
 
Table 3 denotes the results of two familiar tests of normality, i.e. the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test and 
the Shapiro-Wilk Test. When the sample sizes of any study consist of less than 50 (<50 samples) then 
the Shapiro-Wilk Test is more suitable (Vogt, 2005). Therefore, the study considered Shapiro-Wilk test 
to measure the data normality as the sample size of the study was less than 50. Data is supposed to be 
normally distributed if the Sig. value of the Shapiro-Wilk Test is greater than 0.05 (Vogt, 2005). If the 
significance value is lower than 0.05, the data is supposed to have significantly deviated from a normal 
distribution. Table-3 represents that, for all the variables except foreign ownership (FO) the Sig. value 
is larger than 0.05 which indicates data collected for all of the above-stated variables except foreign 
ownership are allocated without deviating from the regular distribution. 
 
Correlation Test 
The study established Correlation Coefficient to discover the influence of ownership structure and firm-
level, industry-level, and country-level control variables on the dependent variables. The correlation 
test is extremely important because it examines whether there is any correlation between dependent and 
independent variables or not before progressing on to regression analysis. The fundamental parameter 
for the correlation coefficient matrix is as follows: the 0.70 and above coefficient values indicate high 
correlations, the 0.40 to below 0.50 coefficient values indicate a low correlations and the 0.00 to below 
0.40 coefficient values indicate a poor correlation of the variables (Chen and Popovich, 2002). 
 
Table 4 represents that, ownership structure proxied by institutional ownership and foreign ownership 
has significant influence on firms’ financial performance measured by return on assets whereas, firms’ 
return on assets are negatively influenced by the other ownership structure variables namely, managerial 
ownership, inside ownership and ownership concentration. Similar findings derived by the researchers 
in case of return on equity where the study found that, another financial performance indicator of the 
firms return on equity is strongly and positively influenced by institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership, whereas, negatively influenced by the other three variables namely, managerial ownership, 
inside ownership and ownership concentration. The correlation matrix also shows that, the financial 
performance of the studied organizations is positively influenced by firm-level characteristics namely, 
firm size and liquidity whereas negatively affected by another two variables namely, leverage and 
inflation rate as country-level characteristics. Furthermore, the study didn’t find any noteworthy 
influence of market capitalization and ROA and ROE as an indicator of firms’ financial performance. 
 




Table 4. Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 MNO 1.0            
2 IO 0.13 1.0           
3 InO 0.43** -0.17* 1.0          
4 OC 0.16** 0.16** -0.08 1.0         
5 FO 0.21** -0.07 -0.20** -0.18* 1.0        
6 FS 0.34** -0.08 0.23* -0.09 0.12** 1.0       
7 LIQ 0.13* 0.25** 0.34** 0.28** 0.19* 0.04 1.0      
8 LEV 0.06 0.59* 0.35** 0.18** 0.25** -0.03** 0.02 1.0     
9 MC  0.23** 0.25** 0.19** -0.12* 0.02 0.21** 0.06 0.19** 1.0    
10 IFR 0.03 0.17** 0.31** 0.25** 0.09 -0.62* -0.31** 0.11* 0.21** 1.0   
11 ROA -0.23** 0.86* -0.26** -0.15* 0.61** 0.51* 0.32** -0.23** 0.06 -0.23** 1.0  
12 ROE -0.12** 0.74** -0.26* -0.17** 0.72** 0.24** 0.28* -0.26** 0.07 -0.15** 0.59** 1.0 
 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 (2 tailed).  












Table 5. Model Summary-1 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .815a .752 .772 0.35 
 
 
Predictors: (Constant), MNO, IO, InO, OC, FO, FS, LIQ, LEV, MC, IFR 
 
Table 6. ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig.  
1 Regression 471.25 4 103.45 19.865 .000b 
 Residual 21917.23 45 425.16   
 Total  49    
Note: a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MNO, IO, InO, OC, FO, FS, LIQ, LEV, MC, IFR 
 






















 (Constant) 35.235 4.317  7.825 .000   
 MNO -1.952 .925 1.245 -1.625 .005 2.735 4.836 
 IO 1.526 .632 .971 1.256 .000 2.856 3.455 
 InO -1.862 0.52 .526 -1.435 .001 2.746 6.362 
 OC .567 .058 .512 4.552 .001 2.621 5.872 
 FO 1.274 .612 1.523 3.725 .000 1.569 3.775 
 FS 1.563 .438 1.625 2.596 .001 2.641 4.562 
 LIQ 1.542 .726 1.432 2.432 .000 2.623 3.752 
 LEV -1.725 .712 .726 -1.621 .001 2.635 4.526 
 MC .512 .532 .126 1.254 .002 2.136 3.256 
 IFR -1.715 .253 .124 -1.163 .001 2.369 2.156 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Table 5 developed on the basis of Model 1 which demonstrated that there is an adjusted R2=0.752 
in multi-regression model with a standard error of 0.35 which indicates that the mean Return on Assets 
deviation predicts that the resulting regression model will be at 95% confidence level of corporate 
governance, which is responsible for 81.5% of Return on Assets (ROA) as a proxy of firm 
performance. The variable had meaningful goodness of fit between variables as F value computed as 
19.865, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table-7 of the coefficient model revealed that the ROA of the sampled companies are significantly and 
positively predicted by the institutional ownership, ownership concentration, and foreign ownership 
supported by earlier researchers (Hossain et al., 2018; Ahmed and Hadi, 2017; Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou, 2007) whereas, significantly and negatively predicted by managerial ownership and insider 
ownership. These findings are supported by other studies conducted earlier (Fattoum-Guedri et al., 
2017; Haron et al. (2017); and Shen et al., 2018). They claimed that managerial ownership and insider 
ownership are negatively correlated with firms' financial performance. The study also found that there 
are a significant positive impact of firm-level characteristics- firm size and liquidity on return on assets 
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as an indicator of financial performance of the studied companies whereas there exists an inverse impact 
of leverage and the inflation rate of firms’ financial performance proxied by ROA.  
 
Table 8. Model Summary-2 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
2 .824a .736 .781 0.52 
 
 
Predictors: (Constant), MNO, IO, InO, OC, FO, FS, LIQ, LEV, MC, IFR 
 
Table 9. ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig.  
2 Regression 466.85 4 187.52 19.625 .000b 
 Residual 22869.32 45 466.15   
 Total  49    
Note: a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MNO, IO, InO, OC, FO, FS, LIQ, LEV, MC, IFR 
 






















 (Constant) 36.521 3.528  6.812 .000   
 MNO -1.625 .934 1.124 -1.315 .000 2.265 3.825 
 IO 1.236 .532 .852 1.246 .001 2.726 4.215 
 InO -1.152 .521 .476 -1.628 .000 2.589 3.656 
 OC .521 .065 .728 4.256 .000 2.633 5.226 
 FO 1.289 .721 1.526 3.821 .001 1.526 3.689 
 FS 1.524 .216 1.782 2.156 .001 2.169 3.625 
 LIQ 1.256 .852 1.429 2.569 .000 2.146 3.589 
 LEV -1.251 .236 1.253 -1.621 .001 2.535 4.521 
 MC 1.241 1.512 .256 1.598 .002 2.169 3.521 
 IFR -1.215 .258 .169 -1.598 .001 3.698 4.258 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
 
Table-8 based on Model-2, which demonstrated that there is an adjusted R2=0736 in multiple regression 
model with a standard error of 0.52, which shows that mean return on equity (ROE), with 95% 
confidence, predicted that corporate governance is responsible for 82.4% variance in equity returns 
(ROE) as pro-equity (ROE) model, would have the resulting regression model. The variable had 
meaningful goodness of fit between variables as F calculated as 19.625, as shown in Table 9. 
 
Table-10 of the coefficient model revealed that the ROE of the sampled companies are significantly 
and positively predicted by the institutional ownership, ownership concentration, and foreign ownership 
whereas, significantly and negatively predicted by managerial ownership and insider ownership.  The 
study also found that there is a significant positive impact of firm-level characteristics- firm size and 
liquidity on return on equity as an indicator of financial performance of the studied companies whereas 
there exists an inverse impact of leverage and the inflation rate of firms financial performance peroxide 
by ROE.  
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5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
The study uses managerial ownership, institutional ownership, insider ownership, ownership 
concentration and foreign ownership, and other control variables to explore the effects of ownership 
structures on company performance. The study proposes that different levels of ownership structures 
have different effects on the financial performance of pharmaceutical and chemical companies in 
Bangladesh. The findings implied that institutional ownership and foreign ownership have significant 
influence in improving the financial performance of studied companies thereby providing evidence 
supporting Sanda et al., (2005); Lazaretou (2007); Aljifri and Moustafa (2007); Chari et al. (2012); Al-
Manaseer et al. (2012); Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012). The inverse effect of managerial ownership, 
insider ownership, and ownership concentration on financial performance was also explored by the 
researchers which supports the findings of earlier researchers Siala (2009); Nuryanah and Islam (2011); 
Mohd (2011); Nazli Anum (2010); La Porta et al. (2000); Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001). Findings of the 
study also reveal that firms' specific variables namely size and liquidity are significantly correlated with 
financial performance whereas, leverage and country-level specific variable inflation rate have a 
negative effect on firms' performance. The contributions of the study have very significant implications 
for several stakeholders like policy makers, shareholders, regulators, researchers, financial analysts, etc. 
The insights can be useful in guiding corporate finance and investment decisions, as well as theoretically 
useful in providing new evidence on how to apply existing capital structure and investment theories. 
 
Limitations and study forward 
The study's results were restricted to 15 Bangladeshi pharmaceutical and chemical companies enlisted 
in DSE and could not be applied to other companies doing business in Bangladesh. Another downside 
of the analysis was that it only used data from the previous ten years (2011-2020) to perform the 
research, which is a limited period to detect changes in the targeted variables over time. To address the 
limitations of the current study, future researchers may perform research using a sample of both 
financial and non-financial organizations over a long period, such as 15-20 years. The study considered 
the basic ownership characteristics to reflect the ownership structure of the sampled firms for 
performing the research. More ownership characteristics variables like block holder’s ownership, 
associated companies’ ownership, etc. may be considered by future researchers and scholars to unearth 
more realistic effect of ownership structure on firms’ financial performance.   
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